Compared to about a decade ago, following the advent of the modern "mass" Internet (especially the World Wide Web), e-mail and cell phones around the mid-1990s, academic and general interest in the impact of these new information and communication technologies (ICTs) has increased tremendously. One of the most popular realms of interest has been the infl uence of digital ICT media on political expression and change, an area where opinion has been sharply divided between optimists (utopians) and pessimists (dystopians), with realists (pragmatists) trying to bridge the rift. A key issue ICT researchers have been concerned with is whether to come up with new theories and methods or to use old or existing ones in humanities and social sciences (especially in the fi elds of media and communications). Related to this, and not restricted to the fi eld of ICTs, is whether researchers from non-Western regions like Africa should expect to make a meaningful contribution to academia and to their countries' policies and "life world" if they use perspectives originating from the highly industrialised world.
Introduction
The spread of political pluralism in Africa in the 1990s was characterised by the rise of a new breed of urban Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), or revitalisation of existing ones, and the emergence of new forms of electronic communication media that could not easily be monitored or controlled by the erstwhile authoritarian ruling elites and institutions. Kenya's "second liberation" and Zambia's "third republic" movements are too complex to be explained in simplistic single-factor cause-effect terms; hence, this paper aims to explore research strategies deployable to understand the contribution of ICTs in reenergising CSOs within a wider political context. The paper examines some issues around ICT research and the theoretical-methodological frameworks around the role of ICTs in political participation. It then reports on part of the fi ndings of a case study on urban CSOs in Kenya and Zambia, countries that were among the fi rst in Africa to adopt multiparty pluralist politics, but whose rulers only cautiously embraced ICTs. It is not the purpose or scope of this paper to provide the entire results; hence, only those relating to old media use of new media are reported for the purpose of exemplifi cation.
CSO use of ICTs in politics: Research opportunities
In the fi rst chapter, "Studying the Net: Intricacies and issues", of his edited volume, Steve Jones (1999:1-27 ) examines the research agenda relating to perceptions of ICTs or Computer Mediated Communications (CMCs). "The Internet is … an engine of social change … (but) our metaphors have led us astray: The Internet is not an information highway" (Jones, 1999:2) . In the opening sentence of the introduction, "Forests, trees, and Internet research" (Jones, 1999:xvii-xxiv) , James T. Costigan confesses, "I am not sure that I know what the Internet is; I am not sure that anyone does." In other words, researchers are either unsure or disagree about what constitutes the Internet, the centrepiece of ICTs. "There is not yet a fi eld known as 'Internet studies', although there may be one before long" (Jones, 1999:xi) . The Association of Internet Researchers and the Oxford Internet Institute 1 have since been founded, but some confusion persisted even about the fi eld of ICT in general, which is sometimes taken to include earlier "traditional" media technologies.
If there is indeed no consensus on the specifi c objects of ICT study, then one of the tasks for researchers, given the generalised assumptions about Internet impacts, is to focus on particular ICT applications. In the case of Africa, for instance, cell phone text messaging and e-mail are popular applications, though there are also Net-surfers, especially in public access areas. Both applications cost comparatively less, especially in terms of time and bandwidth, notwithstanding the risks and limitations of McLuhanesque new media capabilities. Tellingly, some commentators have argued, "no other technology, not even the Internet, has changed lives and work in Africa as much as the mobile phone has" (White, 2003) . More and more anecdotes indicate the continent is changing, having "let freedom ring" as "Africans are unleashing the power" of new technology that "is causing a revolution" (Ashurst, 2001; White, 2003) . For instance, in 2003, Nigerian consumers switched off their cell phones and denied network providers revenue to protest both exorbitant "mobile" airtime charges and poor road conditions (Mudhai, 2003b) . This is happening despite a recent Privacy International report 2 that anti-terrorism legislation and other strategies are used to censor the Internet. Of concern for researchers is how to discern myth from reality and, in doing so, whether to use old theories and methods.
There are those scholars who decry the absence of a coherent broad-based research approach due to the recentness of the new media, the complexity of development dynamics and methodological challenges. 3 For others, the way out is not to jettison but to modify old theories and apply them to ICT research. "The new media need to be included in traditional communication research, but we need to look at those traditional theories untraditionally." (Rice & Williams in Jones, 1999:x) . Possible new media research methods may be extensions of existing methods, but "the new media researcher should consider alternative methods, or even multiple methods, and attempt a triangulation of methods". (Rice & Rodgers in Jones, 1999:x) . Highlighting the range of methods employed in research on Internet technologies, Schneider & Foot (2004:119) show that the emergence of the Internet, and especially the Web, "has challenged scholars to both adapt familiar methods and develop innovative approaches". Jones (1999: xi) emphasises that the Internet is a "different sort of object" that requires a "conscious shift of focus" and method in an interdisciplinary approach-the kind Manuel Castells (2000:25) acknowledges in his "word on method". Calhoun (2002:11) also agrees that ICT research "will advance best if there are more researchers with serious knowledge of both information technology and social science". Although scholars like Debra Howcroft (1999:277) wrote some years back that "there is a pressing need for descriptive and empirical work" given the rhetoric and hyperbole surrounding (simplistic) deterministic utopian predictions (or visions) about immense social change brought about by technological developments, others have recently indicated that "there are beginning to be interesting case studies to complement the usual journalistic anecdotes [even though] social science research on the Internet has barely started" (Calhoun, 2002:1) . However, most of the empirical ICT research conducted (and databacked commentaries written) so far 6 focus on anywhere but Africa.
Given that much of the writing on ICTs has focussed too much on the "digital divide" and the optimist-pessimist debate, Hacker & Van Dijk (2000:220) call for a break from the optimist-pessimist oppositions over digital democracy and an entry into "a phase of empirical research and conceptual elaboration", while Uche (1998) declares that time is ripe for "empirical studies to ascertain the socio-cultural, economic and political ramifi cations" of ICTs on democracy in Africa.
7 Indeed Ott & Smith (2001) note that recent analyses of ICTs and the global information infrastructure (GII) have either been too technologically deterministic, or overly focused on imperialism and on the need for global governance. "Less has been said about the effect of growth in Internet access on state-society relationship, particularly in the developing countries of Africa" (Ott & Smith, 20011) . Signifi cantly, John Tomlinson (2001) points out that underestimating the media is "foolish", yet the entrapment of media-centredness, or, worse, technological determinism, "is to risk losing a larger and more broadly enabling theoretical perspective provided by giving primacy of attention to 'deeper' social, economic and cultural transformations." At the same time, Tomlinson censures the use of predominantly Western theories to explain research problems in the developing world. In fact, some ICT authors have pointed out that Africa is "a region with very specifi c 'patterns of distribution' and a certain testing ground for the social impacts of new technologies" (Polikov & Abramanova, 2003:43) . Whether such regional uniqueness warrants questioning the relevance of "grand" theories and methods remains debatable.
Besides the general literature indicating that the libertarian culture accorded by ICTs shift the balance of power between states and citizens, especially in developing countries (Ferdinand, 2000; Hague & Loader, 1999; Wheeler, 1998; Tsagarousianou, Tambini and Bryan, 1998; Loader, 1997) , the distinctiveness of Africa is refl ected in a number of recent writings presenting ICTs in general and the Internet in particular as threats to the African state. Some scholars (Ott & Smith, 2001; Ott & Rosser, 2000; Ott, 1998) have pointed out that in Africa the impact of the Internet is, ironically, disproportionately greater than its overall spread. This is attributable to what terms legal, economical, social and technical spheres that need to be considered in region-based ICT research. It is for this reason that my study of urban political NGO perception of their use of new ICTs in Kenya and Zambia takes a dialectical approach, cognisant of different kinds of informationality (or digitality), in different settings, with specifi c socio-cultural and political expressions (Castells, 2000:5, 13, 20-21; van Audenhove, 1999) . By this token, the study involved gathering data through interviews with CSO leaders in Nairobi and Lusaka. This is not just because the civil society as an urban phenomenon has been credited most for recent Huntingtonian "third wave" democratisation efforts in Africa , but also because surveys indicate non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are some of the largest users of ICTs in the continent (Jensen in Ott & Smith, 2001; Polikov & Abramova, 2003) .
In studying civil society and democracy within the pluralist perspective, the focus here is on public sphere theory, largely attributed to Habermas (1989) though linked to the works of other political theorists. 8 Guy Berger (1998) argues that the theoretical question about the media and democracy in the South needs to be understood in the global context of the "transnational public sphere". The concept has been critiqued actively or passively by contributors to the volume edited by Craig Calhoun (1992) , by Hannah Arendt (see Benhabib, 1992) , Bruno Latour (see Whitley, 1999) , Jodi Dean (2002) and Chantal Mouffe (see Kapoor, 2002) , among many others. 9 Vitally, Kapoor (2002) questions the relevance for the Third World of the Habermas-Mouffe "debate" over democratic theories. The fact that Habermas' point of reference is the eighteenth century West, that he ignores thorny colonialism-imperialism and, albeit to a lesser extent, downplays the signifi cance of economic conditions and the role of the state, means his theory "can be projected onto other parts of the world only up to a point" (Kapoor, 2002:476-481) . In my opinions, this calls for modifying rather than discarding his idea.
The public sphere concept has recently been modifi ed partly due to the defects of the "old" space-biased media (McQuail, 2000:143,148) , especially in Africa (Bourgnault, 1995; Mudhai, 2002) . The concept is being re-directed to the relatively freer-for-all "new media"-especially the Internet-even if not completely free from government. Keane (2000:77-83 ) distinguishes between micro-(sub-nation state), meso-(nation state level) and macro-(supranational or global) public spheres, identifying the Internet as a key stimulant for their link. Even Habermas has recently conceded to the existence of fragmented and unorganised public spheres (Sassi, 2000:93) . Keane (2000:84) realises his "attempt to radically rethink the theory of the public sphere … opens up new bundles of complex questions with important implications for research in politics and communication". While he (Keane, 2000:86) believes a healthy democracy is one in which various types of public spheres are thriving, with no single one of them actually enjoying a monopoly in public disputes about distribution of power, Dean (2002) argues that dominance is inevitable.
Although this Kenya-Zambia study concurs with the idea of fragmented and complex public spheres, it slightly contradicts the new conception of space by looking at the use of ICTs in physical territorial spaces occupied by state powers. Keane (2000:86-7) and Van Dijk (1999:164-5 ) may argue that the emerging public spheres-such as the Internet-"are politically constructed spaces that have no immediate connection with physical territory" (Keane, 2000:86) , but, in my opinion, where people's vote still matters, especially in Africa where the state remains signifi cant.
Granted, the discourse of nation-building, especially in post-colonial societies like Africa's, is no longer relevant, but digital politics cannot be delinked from fl esh-and-blood organic politics if-as illustrated by the Chinese and Malaysian cases-political, social, cultural, physical, material and even mental conditions are crucial factors (Hacker & Van Dijk, 2000:218-219; . In fact, Van Dijk (1999:165) points out that the exact ways in which new public spheres will be reconstructed cannot be anticipated yet. The ongoing reconstruction does not mean that the three conditions of the modern public sphere (territoriality, unitary and public-private distinction) will disappear completely and that all common ground for societies will dissolve (Van Dijk, 1999:165, 222) . Therefore, this study is about groups of individuals who, wherever they are in the world, share citizenship, heritage and concern for political issues in their specifi c states. This specifi city is still in recognition of the fact that, as Sassi (2000:95) notes, all kinds of combinations of issues and publics, local and global, are possible on the Net. Noting that "we cannot make sense of localised practices and experiences without reference to wider social dynamics that cannot be apprehended empirically", Goode (1999:5-6 ) "would like to see studies of specifi c 'public spheres' carried out in a more empirical and ethnographic vein".
Of particular signifi cance is the view by Hagen (2000:55) and others cited already that political, cultural, economic and social factors shape the forms and extent of political uses of ICTs, which, rather than changing political system, are only trend amplifi ers. This is linked to the argument by Rogers & Malhotra (2000) that the role of actors and their interests has been decisive in the development of new technological applications. Key contexts to consider in the study of digital democracy, says Hagen (2000:66) , are the institutional forms of representation, the role of political parties, current and past roles of mass media and attitude toward technology.
Notably, the public sphere fi ts in the wider notion of civil society, where diverse "intermediate institutions" provide a zone of protection for citizens in their relations with the state. 10 The (interest) "group theory" (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987:16, 19, 25, 36; Hajnal, 2002:1,13) or, more recently, the "civil society theory" (Cohen & Arato, 1992: vii; Grugel, 1999:12) is central to pluralist public sphere thought. Generally, the information revolution has led to a dramatic increase in civic scale in recent years, with particular increase in the number of NGOs from 1992 (Nye, 2004b:90; Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 1-78) . Tellingly, Held (1996:358) argues that democratisation now requires "entrenchment in regional and global networks as well as in national politics", and Grugel (1999:12) points out that non-state actors increasingly engage in operations across state borders as a way of effecting changes within states. In Africa, CSOs have recently become increasingly important as harbingers of democratisation; a phenomenon refl ective of the dual processes of economic and political liberalisation that have propelled NGOs and the media to the forefront as signifi cant actors in the political and economic arena (Dicklitch, 1998:123) . How and why they are important are contentious, not whether they have become important (see Mudhai, 2004b) .
Given the traditional power systems as well as the strength and diversity of CSOs in Africa-including churches and other religious formations, cooperative self-help associations, non-governmental development organisations, etc.-the civil society is a very useful term to understand the complexity of African society (Jørgensen, 1996:43) . Signifi cantly, CSOs in Africa also happen to be the largest ICT users, thus making them even more appropriate "channels" through which to analyse the use of new media for political networking. Despite limitations of resources and cost of Internet access, larger numbers of African NGOs, both on the continent and in the Diaspora, are making effective use of Internet communications tools, including e-mail and the web. Africa is host to or associated with a number of "social tech" and related NGOs or CSO projects like Association for Progressive Communication (APC), Kabissa, Fahamu, Sango-Net, Pambazuka, Africa Democracy Forum (ADF), Women's Organisation of Uganda (Woug-Net) and NGO-NET. 12 APC strives for "Internet and ICTS for social justice and development". Kabissa styles itself as "space for change in Africa" and hosts an African CSO mailing list and bulletin board. Fahamu (Swahili for "understanding" or "consciousness") "has a vision of the world where people organise to emancipate themselves from all forms of oppression … serves the needs of organisations and social movements that aspire to progressive social change and that promote and protect human rights" by harnessing and using ICTs-especially the Internet. Sango-Net describes itself as "a facilitator for an effective and empowering use of ICT tools by development and social justice actors in Africa". Pambazuka (Swahili for "awaken"), a project for Kabissa, Fahamu and Sango-Net, is "a weekly electronic forum for social justice in Africa". The ADF, launched in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2000, is an African regional network of democracy, human rights, and governance organisations seeking to consolidate democracy "by providing opportunities for democrats to openly express their views while also acting as a platform for mutual support and the sharing of resources". Over 120 organisations and individuals working on democracy issues in Africa currently participate in the ADF activities. WougNet, initiated in 2000, is "breaking down barriers to information inequality with a strong emphasis on women". NGO-NET, founded in France in 1998, has the mission of using the Internet "to support NGOs and CBOs, particularly in Africa". All the organisations emerged in the last decade or so and receive a great deal of donor support. Whether or not they are effective in using ICTs as political tools is a matter keen watchers are just beginning to investigate.
Although not much has been done empirically or written academically about African CSOs and their use of ICTs for political purposes, a small body of work is just beginning to emerge. Herman Wasserman (2003:1) explores "the role that new media technologies might play in facilitating an African public sphere in which civil society organisations from different African countries might co-operate in infl uencing public policy". Guy Berger (1998:609-10) credits the Internet as "the media institution that will face the greatest test of both its accessibility to those outside of government, and its contribution to democracy". Ellen Kole (2003) seems to be deriving useful data from her fi eldwork for her NGO-ICT link in Africa which she has been working on since early 1997. 13 Last Moyo (2005) is studying the rise of new media "from the tombstones" of old ones in Zimbabwe. Sylvie Niombo (2003a Niombo ( , 2003b gives a glimpse into the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mwesige (2003) focuses on the use of cybercafes in Uganda by a predominantly urban cyber elite, from a digital divide perspective. The study closest to this one focuses on Tanzania's most connected cities of Dar es Salaam and Arusha. Within the context of what she terms the "Zaptista effect", alluding to the familiar "CNN effect", Mercer (2004) describes the relative failure of donor initiatives to introduce ICTs into NGOs in Tanzania, with the aim of achieving externally-desired changes to local organisational practices. Her fi ndings support other ICT studies that suggest that, if they are to work, ICTs must be structured around the needs and perspectives of their users. Such users are situated within broader social, cultural and political contexts (Cline-Cole & Powell, 2004:7) . While pointing out that "access to ICTs has to some extent facilitated networking among Tanzanian NGOs whose advocacy and lobbying activities have had some impact upon national policies", Mercer concludes that donor engineering of elite civil society leads to "ICT fetishism" likely to result in a case of misplaced optimism.
All the works referred to above are impressive, depicting a variety of approaches-theoretical and empirical. A number of them show-even if not explicitly-that the public sphere concept remains signifi cant, as evidenced in recent works such as that of Roberts & Crossley (2004) . In Africa, attempts should be made to take into consideration local conditions. Hence, the study on Kenya and Zambia buys into the structured contingency approach to democratic theory in African politics (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:20) .
Researching new media and democracy in Kenya and Zambia
The case study of Kenya and Zambia sets out to examine ways in which the use of ICTs by NGOs and media impact on CSO effectiveness with the possibility of enhancing democracy. The CSOs are here taken to be what Fagan (1966:36) defi nes as "channels of communication". The point of entry is a probe into what these actors themselves perceive about the impact of their ICT use. In his study of ICTs in Egypt, Wheeler relies on respondents' fi rst-hand experiences (Cline-Clone & Powell, 2004:8) , in line with the assertion by Hines (2001:8) that "beliefs about the Internet may have important consequences for the ways in which we relate to the technology and [to] one another through it". This study concentrates on the urban environment, especially the capital cities of Nairobi and Lusaka, due to two reasons, theoretical and practical-political. First, the urban environment is considered "the bedrock of democracy and citizenship" or simply a "space" of democracy, one of those that "constitute themselves as political and social agents" (Isin, 2000).
14 Second, urban areas in general and capital cities in particular are normally the bedrock of political activism in Kenya and Zambia, even though nearly 70 percent of the countries' populations live in rural areas. In recent years, both Lusaka and Nairobi have been the seats of radical NGOs and alternative news media. This may be seen to negate the very focus on such CSOs, but there exists two-step-fl ow dynamics of rural-urban networking, including through civic education programmes.
The epistemological and ontological premises of this study are that the people studied construct their own reality and that human action is determined by various environmental conditions. Inquiry goes beyond the people's conceptions and everyday life, and looks at power relations too (see Gunter, 2000:1-22; May, 1998 :38ff. Lindlof, 1995 Taking its cue from Miller & Slater (2000:5) , the study treats ICTs, mainly the Internet, as "continuous with and embedded in other social spaces … within mundane social structures and relations". It is largely about how specifi c civil societies form part of the forces that constitute global ICTs, but do so quite specifi cally as groups with particular physical space and goal commonality (see Miller & Slater, 2000:5) . It is for this reason that the Internet is seen within a context as numerous new practices and technologies, used by diverse people, in diverse real-world locations-not as a monolithic "virtuality" or denaturalised placeless cyberspace "disembedded" and disconnected from offl ine reality (Miller & Slater, 2000:1, 3 & 4) .
Of particular relevance to this study are the works on mediation by Bruno Latour (Miller & Slater, 2000:8; Whitley, 1999) , who would affi rm the Internet as an "actant", contrary to Castells' primary distinction between the Net and the Self, which, treating the Net as a monolithic "reifi ed" structure or "morphology", runs too close to technological determinism and replicates the sociological distinction between structure and agency (Miller & Slater, 2000:8) . Much as the Internet media positions people as actors in more global stages, the networks or "spaces of fl ows" that transcend immediate location only place users in wider fl ows of cultural, political and economic resources. It does not uproot users from their actual settings.
In (Bryman & Burgess, 1999 :X, Denzin & Lincoln, 1998 Creswell, 1998:15) . Included here is the ethnography of the cyberspace, showing particularity to form a fi rm basis for building up bigger generalisations and abstractions (Miller & Slater, 2000:1, 21-22) . The main technique is key informant interviews, chiefl y semi-structured and unstructured-which aid refl ection on alternative conceptions of the subject matter (Kvale, 1996:10-12) . The other related technique is naturalistic observation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:82) . These methods serve to help in fi nding out how and why the subjects use ICTs. To enhance authenticity, the CSO interviews were supplemented by independent interviews (for instance, by academics), examination of Web content and the use of secondary sources.
Scheduling of the fi eldworks around election time-a moment when civil society actors traditionally reach the height of their political activity in both countries-provided the ultimate conditions for democratic practice (Adar, 1999; Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987:26, 32 ). Both nations under study held crucial parliamentary and presidential elections in late 2001 (Zambia) and late 2002 (Kenya). The elections came at an opportune moment to refl ect on the loosening of state stranglehold on communications over the past decade during which Internet and cellular phone dispersed dramatically, as well as to review the maturity of the transition from single party rule to multi-party democracy.
Apart from the commonality of historical and political experiences of both case nations (Kenya and Zambia), 15 their choice was infl uenced by anticipated ease of access (Bryman & Burgess, 1999:XV; De Laine, 2000:4ff) . A further aspect of an ongoing fi eld relationship is exactly whom to observe and/or interview (Bryman & Burgess, 1999:XVI; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:56) . Purposeful sampling, based on John Cresswell's ideas on varied cases and multiple sources (Creswell, 1998:62-3) , was employed to select NGO and media widely known to be active in the area of socio-political mobilisation, especially around election time. Although there are experiential components, the emphasis here is given to the point of view of the CSO actors. The primary focus of the three types of "Internet politics" identifi ed by Margolis & Resnick (2000:8-21 ) is Political uses of the Net (World Wide Web and e-mail), as well as the mobile phone, by people acting on behalf or as part of NGOs and media. 16 This concurs with the current study's conception of Internet politics as a phenomenon that has to be looked at within the context of organic (offl ine) politics. It also tests claims that these "special interests, pressure groups, and nonpartisan public interest groups have found the Net a cheap and fast way to communicate with their members and inform and plead their causes" (Margolis & Resnick, 2000:14) . The next part focuses on only one section of the CSOs studied, the conventional news media, leaving out discussion of urban political NGOs.
Unmuzzling old dogs to bark far and wide
The fact that the recent wave of democratisation in Africa has coincided with the development and spread of new information technology, notably the use of computers for communications purposes (Bourgault 1995:206-208) , underlines the need for the traditional media to embrace these networked technologies in their service to the public. 17 Unlike in the single-party Kenya and Zambia when acquiescence was the norm with only one dominant view diffused via repressed news media and every citizen expected to "follow the footsteps" of the incumbent, the Internet and mobile phone era has greatly reduced state incentive to censor the media. Being what Levinson (1999:5, 13, 14, 42) terms the "medium of media", the Internet in particular has enabled the old news broadcast and print media to publish their content online to be accessed globally. This means that if the government bans a newspaper and mobilises its offi cials to physically remove print copies from the streets, local and foreign audiences would still be able to access the content. Similarly, confi scation of the Times of London or the Washington Post at airports would not prevent citizens from accessing the offending contents online. Of course, like China, the state can block the web sites, but these can easily be mirrored. In any case, apart from Zimbabwe, hardly any sub-Saharan African country has seriously embarked on the futile and expensive game, perfected by China, of Internet censorship. Consequently, the distribution of "old" media via new media is one way that CSOs have put ICTs to political use.
Although the old print and broadcast media are dominated by the offi cial view and therefore tend to perpetuate state hegemony, the advent of ICTs have enhanced media freedom-even if this has not gone far enough. The news media used ICT to provide speedy up-to-date content. In Kenya, The Daily Nation and the East African Standard competed to update their web sites with breaking news, especially around election time. In its annual fi nancial report, issued in November, the Nation Media Group (NMG) said the online edition of its fl agship Daily Nation newspaper received more than 1 million hits per day (CPJ, 2002) . In September 2003, the Nation's editor in charge of media convergence, Charles Onyango-Obbo, said their successes have included "the over three million hits the online Nation gets". 18 Indeed, the Nation recorded peak hits during the August 1998 Al-Qaida bomb blasts in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The fact that key donors and world leaders, like former United States President Clinton, access news on poor governance in online newspapers, like NMG's The East African, irk leaders like former Kenyan President Moi (Mudhai, 2002) .
Of course the most telling fear of Internet news was demonstrated in the Zambian case cited above of the Post edition 401, which carried a report the government claimed violated state secrets. "They were planning to have a snap referendum and change the constitution which would effectively bar Dr Kaunda from contesting the Presidency. We carried a story that exposed all that," said the Post founder and managing editor, Fred M'membe (2001). The government banned the newspaper and confi scated copies from the streets. "It was too late; the story was already on the web site. They went to Zamnet, our ISP, and forced them to pull that edition out but it was too late as other people in the USA had already downloaded the whole edition and put it back online (on a mirror site)." M'membe and his staff were arrested and charged, but they won the case. The court ruled that there was no violation of state secrets because Chiluba's strategy to bar Kaunda had already been executed and was therefore public knowledge. The Post continued to get covert and overt harassment, including phone tapping, to which the Chief Inspector of Police conceded. The newspaper changed to the exclusive use of mobile phones, making phone tapping diffi cult (but not impossible) for the government. M'membe says this made the Post's own operations much easier and effi cient. Aditional harassment came in the form of suspected arson by a Post staff member suspected to be a government mole who had been left behind in the offi ce at night to update the newspaper's web site.
Francis Kasoma (2002:156) points out that, although CPJ at one time cited Zambia as holding the record for more pending criminal defamation cases and other legal actions against journalists than any other African country, it notes that the country's independent press had remained resilient and undaunted. "There can be no doubt that the use of web sites and e-mail by the Zambian media has helped to enhance press freedom. When the government banned one of the Post's editions, it was available on the Internet for some time before the government intervened and shut it down" (Kasoma, 2002:156) . In fact, even though the government forced the ISP Zamnet to remove the Post edition 401 of February 5, 1995, from its web site, Zambians in the United States had already got the wind of the ban of the print edition and in the intervening period (two days) had "mirrored" the online edition onto an American web site. The government's move to shut down the original web site turned out to be futile although making it illegal for anyone to possess or read the printed copy may have worked locally. It is at this point when the government tried to ban online hosting of the Post altogether that Zamnet convinced the state to publish its own newspapers online. 20 Yet another example is Zambia's fi rst Internet-only newspaper, Information Dispatch, launched in 2000, a year before the general election, by a group of young journalists. The web site recorded between 10,000 and 14,000 visitors, with an average monthly fi gure of 300,000 visitors located in North America (especially USA) and Europe (especially UK), as well as Zambia and other African countries. Their web site received the highest number of hits whenever there was a major political debate or crisis. "During the third term debate, we were a very authentic source. Almost on a daily basis something was happening and we kept hammering and hammering until at one time we had a confl ict with the state because of that," recalled Information Dispatch founding managing editor, Kennedy Mambwe. "We had an interview with one of the Western diplomats whom I can't name. He told me categorically that 'our feeling as the diplomatic community is that the President is being hypocritical because he had promised to abide by the constitutional provision' (limiting his rule to two fi veyear terms). That story was picked up by the wires, and seen by offi cials in one of the Zambian missions abroad who faxed it back to (their superiors) Zambia," Mambwe explained. "Agents from the government intelligence came to probe us to fi nd out who we talked to but we chose to abide by our ethical values not to disclose the identity of our source." The government issued a press statement accusing the diplomatic community of meddling in their internal affairs. In response, the Dean of the Diplomatic Community issued its press statement to ameliorate the situation. "From then on, we have been under surveillance, but we are not intimidated. We just report accurately," said Mambwe, who later took time off to sharpen his skills with a Masters degree in new media at London's City University. Mambwe said he felt much freer to express himself as an online journalist compared to his days as a traditional media practitioner. "Currently in Zambia, there is no law that could be applied against Dispatch (say to shut it down). I can operate from my home. I can host my site from free software space wherever-in the USA or the UK, on the dot.com. They can't stop me. This is bringing checks and balances to the government because they know that even if they try to censor the dailies, they can't do anything against us." Despite these pronouncements, some level of vulnerability could be discerned from the group's shoestring budget and their use of the state ISP Zamnet. This is discernible in the experiences of the Monitor, which viewed faults in their Internet connections that manifested themselves as technical as acts of interference by government agents because the glitches almost always occurred when they received e-mails from two Zambian exiles critical of the government.
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When the Monitor carried a lead story in early 2001 that President Chiluba was running for a third term and that he had drafted district administrators to voice this on his behalf, a State House media spokesperson contacted the quasi-state ISP Zamnet to get them to pull the story. "People at the Zamnet were really scared. The ISP was really intimidated," recalls Arthur Simuchoba, editor of the Monitor. It is worth noting that the state did not even try to intimidate the newspaper directly, perhaps due to the earlier experience with the Post. (The management of Zamnet must be commended for their diplomatic resistance of pressure to stop hosting the newspaper and giving links to their web sites.) "The concern was more on why the material was being disseminated internationally. In many cases, that has always been the problem-why Zamnet, which is not a newspaper, put anti-government material on the web," said Simuchoba.
It would appear the Zambian government was more worried about reports on The Monitor online than the hard copy on the streets. "What is posted on the Internet is accessible to the wider world therefore Zambia is monitored effectively by the World Bank, the IMF and the bilateral donors. Just the fact that these lenders are aware of cases of bad governance creates pressure on the government. It makes the government uneasy," said Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) President Alfred Zulu, who stressed that this does not necessarily mean the government is not worried about domestic opinion as well. "As the world becomes a global village and information becomes readily available, governments become a little more jittery that their conduct at home is brought to immediate international scrutiny at once and that challenges their ability to practice bad governance. It challenges them much quicker because they are being monitored, scrutinised and examined," Zulu explained further, pointing out at that "the new media, the Internet is not owned by anybody so they constitute a new haven-a departure from the current structure of print and electronic media".
An interesting and attractive aspect of online editions is their provision for interactive features, allowing users to comment, give feedback and vote on controversial issues. The Nation recently revamped their web site and included interactive features. At the end of the story, the reader has the option to print, email to a friend or save. In what appears to be competition for online audiences and revenue, the Standard has also re-launched their web site with the options to print or forward stories. The Dispatch of Zambia had this feature much earlier. "We have an interactive feature-an attraction to the readership. At the end of every story, there is a provision for readers to comment. People feel free to express their views. We also get instant feedback," said Mambwe. Political and human-interest stories triggered more interest, some having up to twenty comments compared to an average of seven (Mudhai, 2004b) .
Another way that the Post and other Zambian as well as Kenyan media workers have utilised new media is "to complain, within seconds of an incident of censorship or arrest, to organisations and governments throughout the world that can exert pressure on the government for denying press freedom" (Kasoma, 2002:156) . There are several such cases in both countries, the most recent one in Kenya being the huge support by the International Press Institute among others that forced the Attorney General to order the dropping of criminal defamation charges against a writer with the Standard in February 2005.
The news media web site promote interaction through interpersonal online discussions and e-mail relays that often fi nd their way in the mainstream media-sometimes without the realisation of conservative newspaper editors who hardly take part in electronic networking. For example, the Daily Nation recently published as one of its main stories the content of a speculative e-mail forwarded among some Kenyan Internet users about the possible ailment of the late Vice-President Wamalwa Kijana. The innuendos in the e-mail suggested that he had been consulting a United Kingdom-based HIV/AIDS specialist, Dr Margaret Johnson, for some time. The content was actually a press release on the web site of the hospital, detailing Johnson's profi le when she was promoted. What the Daily Nation editors did not realise-or conveniently chose to ignore, as Tawana Kupe would suggest 22 -when they published the story headlined, "Wamalwa doctor promoted", was that the press release was more than a year old (Mudhai, 2004b) . Despite the dangers of inaccuracies, ICTs have enabled news media to move closer to engage with readers.
A number of newspapers publish protest or suggestion letters or declarations from organised groups, like the Kenya Community Abroad (KCA). One of the most concrete products of Zambia-list listserv debates took the form of a collective letter of protest that appeared in the Post (Spitulnik, 2002:187) . The letter was drafted and revised on the Z-list over a period of several weeks. Entitled "Special Report: A letter to President Chiluba from Zambians living abroad" (the Post, 340, 1995.11.8) , it was an extremely detailed declaration of "dismay and disappointment at the state of affairs in Zambia" (Spitulnik, 2002: 187) . Signed by forty individuals, the letter carefully diagnosed the state of the nation-including inter-party violence, the nose-diving economy and political corruption-and called on then President Chiluba to "curb the culture of political intolerance" and to "create moral standards for civil servants". The letter clearly demonstrates how political discussions on the Internet can be consolidated as a collective voice in a more visible mass media arena (Spitulnik, 2002: 177) . Although not directly referenced, many of the themes raised in the letter subsequently recurred in the Post editorial columns, letters to the editor and other "Special Reports"; in that sense, the letter joined a loud chorus of other voices in the independent press (Spitulnik, 2002:187) .
In other cases, Internet users post material from mainstream newspapers as a basis for the discussions. For example, a few subscribers to Zambia-list discussion listserv regularly re-post the full texts of newspaper articles from the web pages of the Times of Zambia and the Post (Spitulnik, 2002:187) . It is for this reason that mainstream media need to embrace the benefi ts accorded by the new media more strongly in order to expand space for dialogue that infl uences policy issues. This is particularly prevalent among the various listservs and discussion groups for Kenyans and Zambians in the Diaspora. The Internet has therefore "opened up Zambia's [and of course Kenya's] media institutions to readers outside the country, giving them the opportunity to keep up with the news and to respond via e-mail to advertisers and editors" (Kasoma, 2002:155) .
One may argue that the duplication of print content on the online editions does not add much value to the news, but this is an important step in the direction of free expression. First, the media are freer than they were before. Second, a number of media web sites, like that of the Nation, allow users to "fi nish" (debate or expand on) their stories through interactive features. Even though Kasoma (2002:155) indicates that, "most newspapers and stations have an online presence that has brought news to places previously not reached", one may argue that Internet access is limited; but so is access to print and broadcast media. In fact, Internet and mobile phone diffusion is far greater than that of the news media in Africa. In any case, the two-step fl ow model that has always worked in Africa can be applied to these new media as well. At the same time, it is important to point out that, although digital technology and electronic distribution enhance news media effectiveness, they do not necessarily increase their effects. "Zambia's Post can do exposés continuously, with little apparent effect on the accountability and restraint of government" (Berger, 1998:602) .
One of the main contentions of the paper is that one cannot study the new media in isolation from the old; it is in the interaction between the two that much of the political impact of the new media is to be found (Mudhai, 2004b) .
Conclusion: Enhanced effi ciency thesis
This article has examined theoretical and methodological approaches in the examination of the use of ICTs by civil society organisations in Kenya and Zambia. The new public sphere allows plurality of viewpoints and multiplicity of actors. Emphasis has been placed on the study of ICTs within a context, with the central assumption that ICTs do not replace existing socio-political networks and face-to-face communication, but are added to them.
Expectations of CSO infl uence on politics through their use of ICTs have been somewhat overdrawn given the limits in Africa of a still too dominant state and intra-CSO weaknesses, not to mention socio-economic and cultural barriers to ICT access. In other words, ICTs enhance the effi ciency of CSOs in playing their role as harbingers of change, but this is within the impact of ICTs as trend amplifi ers rather than radical tools of change. At the moment, we can only talk of subjective effi ciency, mainly from the perspective of CSOs themselves, rather than actual effi ciency that would be independently and empirically verifi able to lead to infl uence. Clearly, more empirical research is needed in this and related areas.
As argued elsewhere (Mudhai, 2004b) , news media establishments need to display more commitment towards content creation rather than taking the shortcut of fi lling airtime and newsprint with stale foreign material. They should recognise the place of online or digital journalism with its unique attributes of immediacy, hypertextuality, interactivity and multimediality, and pay particular attention to accuracy. On the other hand, governments should provide enabling policies and incentives that enhance content creation. In other words, while the state should not be overbearing in monitoring and controlling public communication space, it need not be rendered completely irrelevant; it needs to be strengthened, not in a coercive sense, but in the sense of having the capacity to provide direction in situations where global structural matters may negatively affect healthy local democracy.
